Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks

for the extra minute, too.

I regret to inform you that phase one of what I think all of us

in retrospect will call this genocide in Darfur has nearly been completed.

This phase one has been the phase of ethnic cleansing. Let

us tell the truth. The world did not lift a finger to stop it. There

was not one United Nations Security Council resolution, there was

not one permanent U.N. human rights monitor put on the ground,

there was not any additional pressure applied. Rather, incentives

were being offered to the perpetrators at the very moment of the

height of the ethnic cleansing, including seats at the January State

of the Union Address and the removal of Khartoum from one of the

U.S. terrorist lists last month.

A new phase, phase two of this potential genocide, has now

begun. This is the phase in which the government uses a killing

famine to finish what it started. Khartoum is calling on 15 years

of experience in creatively using starvation and disease as weapons

of war. Khartoum is betting that the slow strangulation of Darfur

will not draw the intervention of the international community, and

so far that bet is paying off.

With all due respect to the previous panel, the international response

to this second phase, this phase of the strangulation

through a killing famine of this likely genocide, is completely inadequate

to prevent the onset of this killing famine and a vast loss

of life. The current approach simply will not succeed. There is no

overall strategic plan to deal with the crisis. The U.N. is scrambling

and the Security Council is bickering. The Europeans are

shrinking from the horror and the Africans are deferring to sovereignty.

The U.S. is still reacting, still not putting forth a comprehensive

strategy for confronting this disaster.

If our actions are to have impact, we have to push the envelope

further than it has been pushed before. First, we have to move

quickly and boldly to prevent phase two of this potential genocide

from succeeding. In other words, we have to act robustly to break

the back of this killing famine.

Preventing famine requires a number of actions. It requires first

and foremost to shine a spotlight, most effectively through the U.N.

Security Council, on Khartoum’s policy of starvation as a weapon.

Congress has authorized or appropriated billions of dollars over the

last decade and a half to clean up the human mess created by

these tactics devised in Khartoum. We have 15 years of empirical

evidence that when this government is publicly challenged, consistently

challenged, and multilaterally challenged, it moderates its behavior

in response to that pressure.

Preventing the famine also requires immediately creating a humanitarian

surge capacity much greater than what has been envisioned

and what you have just heard about in the previous panel,

using civilian and military assets in the region to undertake a

short-term front-loaded major increase in deliveries that address

the deficiencies and gaps in food, in medicine, sanitation, water,

and shelter.

If all else fails, if all of that fails, then we have to be prepared

to authorize chapter 7 in the Security Council to stop the famine

and to save lives.

Second, I think we have to move aggressively to assure that

phase one of the potential genocide, the ethnic cleansing, which actually

continues to this day and I think we will hear from Julie

about that, we have to ensure that that does not resume more

forcefully and is not allowed to stand. That is, these atrocities surrounding

the ethnic cleansing must be confronted.

Confronting ethnic cleansing requires public condemnation of

Khartoum’s support for the Janjaweed militias and strong pressure

to ensure that the Janjaweed are neutralized. We still have not

done that through the Security Council, in a Security Council resolution.

As long as that does not happen, Khartoum understands

that it can continue to do what it wants to do.

Confronting ethnic cleansing also requires rapidly deploying this

robust monitoring presence that is being talked about, but it needs

to include many more cease-fire monitors than are being envisioned

to this point and they need to have a protection mandate. Can you

imagine, we are putting cease-fire monitors out there that do not

have a mandate to protect civilians. We need U.N. human rights

monitors on the ground. We do not have them. And we need the

use of satellite imagery. There was a question asked about whether

we have the intelligence assets necessary to address the problem

there. I think we have some of those intelligence assets and they

need to be shared with the Security Council members. We need to

be moving that information around and demonstrating that this

ethnic cleansing campaign continues.

Confronting ethnic cleansing further requires the introduction of

personal accountability for crimes against humanity. The resolution

that Congress is working on now should include targeted sanctions—

the House version in fact does now—against officials of the

government who have been most responsible for orchestrating

these atrocities and the companies, more importantly actually, the

companies that they are board members of and are running, these

companies need to be subjected to targeted sanctions.

I really urge you not to let up on this. You will have an impact

on the calculations of the regime in Khartoum. And you should

urge Secretary Powell to get Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper

out to the region immediately, looking at mechanisms of accountability.

This also will have a dramatic impact on the calculations

of the ruling party in Khartoum.

Third, we cannot forget that all these atrocities come in the context

of war in Sudan, and there must be a corresponding and comprehensive

strategy for peace that deals simultaneously with the

three interrelated conflicts in Sudan: the north-south conflict, the

Darfur conflict, and then the conflict that has been spawned by the

government’s support for the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern

Uganda. All three of these are linked. All three of these need to be

addressed.

The best way to address it I think, and it is very, very vital that

the administration move soon, to appoint a new special envoy now

that Senator Danforth will move over to his new job, to empower

someone as comprehensively and as at a high level as Senator Danforth

was empowered, but also to give them staff and assets to be

able to undertake the full-time diplomacy in pursuit of peace in all

three of these interrelated conflicts.

In closing, I think we need congressional leadership on this issue

now. We should not forget that it was congressional pressure that

provided the impetus for the United States to stop the slaughter

in Bosnia, to confront apartheid in South Africa, and to address

countless other cases that cried out for action. Historically, Congress

has been a major force in helping administrations find their

better angels. I think Congress can help ensure that this President

does not have to hold another ceremony at the Holocaust Museum

in 6 months, vowing ‘‘Yet again, never again.’’

Thank you.

Thank you for holding this urgently needed hearing on the complex crisis in

Sudan. While precious time has been lost, it is not too late to put forward concrete

actions that could prevent the needless deaths of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese,

and to conceive a much more comprehensive diplomatic strategy that might

bring peace to this long-tortured country.

Today, Sudan is three crises in one. This means that any response has to be more

complex and nuanced than what might have been believed six months ago:

The first crisis is the longest running, the 21 year war between the government

of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which

has resulted in two million deaths and a structural humanitarian emergency.

The second crisis is that wrought by the Sudanese Government’s support for the

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a northern Ugandan insurgency that has

wreaked havoc on both southern Sudan and northern Uganda for years, resulting

in the highest rate of child abductions in the world, among other depredations.

The third crisis is the most immediate and urgent human rights and humanitarian

disaster in the world today . . . the unfolding evidence of conditions of

genocide in Darfur.

On the first crisis, a peace deal between the government and the SPLM/A may

be imminent, but that will only signal a new phase of negotiations and challenges.

Every step of the way in the implementation process will be undermined by elements

in Khartoum opposed to the peace deal, and will be challenged by policy incoherence

and a lack of capacity on the part of the SPLM/A. Militias—including the

LRA—will continue to be used by elements of the ruling party to undermine cohesion

in southern Sudan, especially around the oilfields. The U.S. must be ready and

willing to continue its deep involvement in the peace implementation process. Providing

funding for a peace observation mission is a necessary but insufficient role.

Additional reconstruction resources must be found, diplomatic and intelligence capacities

must be committed, and willingness to confront efforts to undermine the implementation

process must be made clear.

On the second crisis, after well over a decade of death and destruction caused by

the LRA, there still remains no coherent international strategy to respond to this

tragedy. The U.S. should work with the Ugandan government and other interested

actors in crafting such a strategy, which in the first instance must seek an end to

all Sudanese Government support and safe haven for the LRA.

I will focus the remainder of my testimony on the third crisis: Darfur.

Vague pronouncements by the G-8 and UN Security Council cannot obscure the

fact that the existing global effort to prevent the onset of famine and vast loss life

in Darfur is grossly inadequate. Continued stonewalling by key members of the UN

Security Council from Europe, Africa and Asia has ensured that the world’s highest

collaborative body fiddles as Darfur burns.

*The current approach to preventing famine and further atrocities simply will not*

*succeed.*

Although there are fancy charts and graphs that can now track the dying months

in advance, and millions of new dollars pledged in the Geneva donors conference

earlier this month, there is no overall strategic plan for preventing a killing famine

and bringing a comprehensive peace to Sudan. The world is still reacting, still behind

the curve of this slowly evolving disaster.

To prevent the deaths of tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of Sudanese, there

needs to be an *immediate humanitarian surge* in the delivery of relief assistance in

order to break the back of the impending famine. This surge needs to be supported

by adequate numbers of monitors, by actions to increase U.S. and multilateral leverage,

and by a robust diplomatic initiative to end the interrelated wars in Darfur,

southern Sudan and northern Uganda.

It is appalling that we have been reduced to semantic debates about whether the

situation in Darfur is ethnic cleansing or genocide. The Genocide Convention prohibits

actions ‘‘calculated to bring about the physical destruction of groups in whole

or in part’’, and compels signatory states to act to prevent them. In ICG’s judgement,

*the situation in Darfur more than satisfies the Genocide Convention’s conditions*

*for multilateral preventive action.* But even if argument continues about

whether this is a case of actual or potential genocide, it cannot be contested that

in Darfur a large section of Sudan’s population is alarmingly at risk, that the Government

of Sudan has so far failed comprehensively in its responsibility to protect

them, and that it is time for the international community, through the Security

Council, to assume that responsibility.

This is not Rwanda of 1994, a country to which very little attention was being

paid. Sudan has been at the top of the Bush Administration’s radar screen since

it came to office. It is not credible to say now that we did not know what was happening.

Over the past year, Darfur has been Rwanda in painfully slow motion.

The humanitarian situation is worse than is still generally appreciated, due to ongoing

state-sponsored violence, layers of aid obstruction, the lack of an overall humanitarian

strategic plan, and the weakened state of displaced Sudanese.

There tends to be an assumption that because the Govermnent of Sudan has finally

begun to act on promises to grant a higher level of access, the numbers at

risk will be dramatically reduced. That is not accurate. The government has provided

access much too late, IDPs and refugees have been displaced for long periods,

they are in terribly weakened states, they are subject to sexual abuse and attack,

they do not have shelter, their encampments lack latrines and are horrendously

overcrowded, and it is now raining in southern and western Darfur. Infectious diseases

and dysentery will drive up the body counts rapidly; And the Khartoum government,

its use of food as a weapon well honed by years of practice in the south

and Nuba Mountains, continues to apply layers of obstruction—for example, by instituting

long delays in customs clearance of relief supplies, and insisting that only

Sudanese trucks can be used in the delivery of such supplies.

Conventional responses are simply inadequate to prevent rapidly increasing mortality

rates, and the current response will fail unless buttressed by a number of bold

and urgent actions.

Compounding the problem, in our judgment, is that the numbers of at-risk civilians

will continue to increase. The Janjaweed continue to undertake attacks against

villages, prey on internally displaced persons (IDPs), and obstruct aid activities: it

cannot be assumed that the centrally-directed ethnic cleansing campaign is over.

The Janjaweed are being integrated into the army and police; no one has been

charged with any crime, and their actions are not being challenged. There remains

a state of total impunity. It is absolutely critical to demand that Khartoum take action

to curtail the impact of the Janjaweed, to disarm them, to disband their headquarters,

and to begin to charge those responsible for war crimes. All this must aim

to reverse in full the ethnic cleansing campaign that has occurred over the last year.

In order to fully confront the multifaceted crisis in Sudan, we need to push the

envelope of response further than it has been pushed before. The U.S. must work

multilaterally as much as possible, but be prepared as a last option to work unilaterally

when others continue to bury their heads in the sand. European, African and

Asian members have obstructed more assertive action by the UN Security Council,

while the U.S. has been unwilling to date to expend diplomatic capital to help sway

these countries towards a more robust posture.

In the first instance, nothing could be more effective than working through the

UN Security Council to immediately pass a Darfur-specific resolution that comprehensively

responds to the present emergency and lays the groundwork for sustainable

peace. This Security Council resolution should endorse actions that would

prevent starvation, stop further fighting and atrocities and press for a negotiated

peace—while warning of possible further coercive measures should these objectives

be resisted.

More broadly, the U.S. Congress and the Bush Administration should work

through the UN Security Council and unilaterally toward the following urgent,

interrelated objectives:

The U.S. through the UN Security Council and directly

should strongly and publicly condemn the various layers of obstruction that the

Sudan government currently employs to delay the delivery of relief assistance.

We need only note the Khartoum government’s fifteen year track record of ceasing

unacceptable activity only when it becomes the source of public condemnation

and exposure. With this amount of empirical evidence to support the need

for public and assertive pressure, anyone arguing for quiet diplomacy and constructive

engagement at this juncture would be providing political cover for the

government’s atrocities.

Working with the European Union and other donors, the U.S.

should expand the existing capacity for emergency relief deliveries to the internally

displaced in Darfur and refugees in Chad to meet the growing humanitarian

need. This will require additional resources for securing urgently needed

non-food items and the capacity to deliver those items. There is a need to establish

immediately a surge capacity through the utilization of both civilian and

military assets in the region—recognizing the particular value of European

Union and U.S. military assets, especially airlift capacity—that would allow for

short-term, front-loaded increases in deliveries that address deficiencies and

gaps in food, medicine, clean water, sanitation, and shelter.

The U.S. and EU should work with the UN to support

a large increase in the number of WFP, UNICEF, and NGO monitors that

are allowed into Darfur to oversee the relief effort and should provide them adequate

security;

President Bush should request the UN Secretary General to

take the lead personally in efforts at humanitarian diplomacy.

In the event full access is denied, Janjaweed attacks continue,

and mortality rates escalate, the U.S. should accelerate contingency planning

for using military assets to protect emergency aid and Sudanese civilians.

The U.S. should work through the UN Security Council to request a UN Department

of Peacekeeping Operations assessment of possible scenarios and define

operational plans for guaranteeing humanitarian relief and protection of civilians

through the deployment of sufficient civilian and military forces under

Chapter VII authority. Such a deployment would seek to take control of, stabilize

and protect IDP camps in Darfur, and create a logistical pipeline to deliver

assistance to these camps.

The U.S. should work through the UN Security Council for

multilateral condemnation of the Sudanese Government’s support for Janjaweed

militias through direct assistance, provision of barracks, supply of arms, etc.

The Security Council should demand that the Government of Sudan arrest

Janjaweed commanders who continue attacking villages and IDPs, and immediately

demobilize and disarm the Janjaweed militia. If this does not occur,

Chapter VII authority should be sought to disarm and demobilize the

Janjaweed.

The U.S. should work through the UN Security

Council and the UN Human Rights Commission for the immediate deployment

of UN human rights monitors in Darfur.

The U.S. should support the African Union and the parties

to the Darfur conflict to negotiate a substantial increase in the number of

ceasefire monitors and work with the EU and other donors to fully resource

these monitors.

The U.S. should share its satellite imagery with the UN

Human Rights Commission and the UN Security Council, as well as collaborate

in more closely tracking the activities of the Janjaweed and other government

military assets that are attacking villages or IDPs. Such imagery could also reveal

any ceasefire violations by any party to the conflict.

The U.S. should work through the UN Secretary

General to initiate a process now to determine the conditions which would enable

the safe, secure and sustainable return of the victims of ethnic cleansing

under international guarantees, support and control.

There must be a coordinated diplomatic strategy

to end the three interrelated wars in south/central Sudan, Darfur, and northern

Uganda. This requires a rapid conclusion to the comprehensive agreement between

the government and the SPLM/A, the construction of a credible process

to settle the conflict in Darfur, and the development of a strategy to end the

crisis created by the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda and southern

Sudan. Leaving behind any one of these will undermine the entire effort to

achieve peace in Sudan.

Now that Senator Danforth has been nominated to be U.S. Ambassador

to the UN, President Bush should move rapidly to name another Special

Envoy for peace in Sudan. Such an envoy should be tasked to work full time

and simultaneously on all three conflicts bedeviling Sudan, and should be given

the necessary resources to carry out the mission.

The direct negotiations between Sudanese Vice President

Ali Osman Taha and SPLM/A Chairman John Garang were instrumental

in moving that peace process forward. The Darfur and LRA efforts should utilize

this relationship in seeking a rapid end to those crises.

The U.S. must make clear that if Sudan does not provide full humanitarian access,

neutralize the Janjaweed, and move forward on peace efforts, the imposition

of targeted sanctions (travel restrictions and asset freezes) will be authorized

against those officials responsible for the atrocities. Ruling party companies with

which these officials are associated should also be targeted. Further, the U.S. should

work through the UN Security Security to make clear that such intransigence would

also lead to the imposition of an arms embargo and the deployment of an international

commission of inquiry or a high level panel to investigate the commission

of war crimes in Darfur, a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a future

mechanism of accountability.

All the actions outlined above may not be practical in conventional circumstances.

But with two million already dead as a result of the government-SPLM/A war and

hundreds of thousands more at risk today in Darfur, circumstances in Sudan require

unconventional responses.

If the Bush administration continues to debate internally about what to do, certain

European countries remain reserved due to tactical and commercial considerations,

and the UN Security Council remains muzzled by the reservations of a few

members, then the U.S. Congress should provide desperately needed leadership.

*We should not forget that it was Congressional pressure that provided the impetus*

*for the U.S. to stop the slaughter in Bosnia, confront apartheid in South Africa, and*

*countless other cases of Congressional leadership. Historically, Congress has been a*

*major force in helping administrations find their better angels.*

The Senate should demand that the Bush administration develop a much more

robust and comprehensive multilateral strategy to break the back of the emerging

famine in Darfur.

The Senate should urge President Bush to name a new Special Envoy whose brief

is more operational than Senator Danforth’s and more comprehensive, in order to

deal with all three conflicts plaguing Sudan.

The Senate should pass the House version of its Sudan resolution, which calls for

targeted sanctions against senior Khartoum officials, and ensure that the resolution

language on targeted sanctions is in forthcoming Authorization and Appropriations

bills. The Senate should also look for other ways to introduce accountability into the

discussion of what to do about Sudan, in order to confront the continuing genocidal

actions of the Janjaweed and its supporters in the Sudan government, as outlined

above

The best way to end this tragedy is to bring home the costs of the atrocities in

Darfur to the Sudanese officials who are directing them. Every day that we continue

to look past this terrible record of death and destruction, we ensure that it will continue

and intensify.

Thank you for that. That is an interesting

question, Senator. I think we are Siamese twins on this issue. I

think there is not a drop of light between us on this. I think the

human rights groups, the conflict prevention groups, the humanitarian

organizations, the NGOs in general, if they cannot say it

publicly because they are on the ground, they believe essentially—

agree essentially in large part with this agenda that we have outlined

to you.

I want to reiterate just for emphasis what the specific actions

that the U.S. Congress can lead on, as opposed to sort of the general

actions that the U.S. administration, the Bush administration,

ought to be doing. I think specifically—and let me preface this by

saying that 300,000 people do not have to die. It is not exactly—

Senator Brownback started his questioning by saying that Andrew

Natsios has said if things go right.

Now, that is if things go right and we do things the conventional

way, which is we nickel and dime everybody and argue over access

for the next few weeks and do the same old thing we always do.

Obviously, it is the most extreme situation we have faced in a long,

long time. It argues for a much greater, much more robust humanitarian

response.

So at this juncture we need to go to the Security Council. We just

had a resolution last week on the implementation of the peace

agreement between the north and south, between the SPLM and

the government. We need a second resolution, as Julie said, that

has direct bearing on the humanitarian response, that calls for the

Government of Sudan to stop with all these layers of bureaucracy

that we heard from Roger. They need to be called out on it consistently

and multilaterally. If it is just the U.S. saying these things,

they know they can contain it. They will just give us our visas

more quickly, as Roger said, but they will not move to change the

entire edifice which is built for using starvation as a weapon.

So I think we need to use the Security Council as a battering

ram on Khartoum at this juncture to press for that opening of access.

And the UK, yes.

Right, public pressure. They will tell you, the

administration will tell you, rightly, that at this juncture perhaps

5, maybe more, of the 15 members of the Security Council do not

agree and will oppose moving forward in the Security Council. So

this requires some robust diplomacy in New York and in capitals

at the highest levels of the U.S. executive branch to go to the leaderships

of these governments that are opposed to moving for sovereignty

reasons and for other reasons, for commercial reasons,

other things that link them to the Sudanese Government, and urge

and push and cajole for acquiescence for Security Council movement

on this issue.

That is good, you are asking the right question,

because there are multilateral actions that can be taken and

there are unilateral actions that can be taken. We have now talked

to you about the multilateral, but the unilateral action that can be

taken is for the U.S., and working directly with the European

Union but moving forward as aggressively as we can, is looking at

what kind of assets we have in the region.

We have excess capacity, military capacity, in Djibouti. We have

1,200 forces there who are conducting training programs in the

context of our counterterrorism efforts, and it is an underutilized

capacity. The French have a larger contingent there, as well as

throughout Central Africa. We need capacity to move items, relief

items, from the port, which most of those goods are being, as Roger

told you, being held up in the port. We need the capacity to move

that rapidly in the next month directly to the ground.

We are going to look back 3 months from now and say: Damn

it, why did we not do something when we had a chance, as the

rains were just beginning, because 3 months from now it is really

not going to matter. It is going to be much more difficult.

It started a week ago, 2 weeks ago. So the

problem is now that we have got to—it is what we call a surge capacity.

We need to surge our assets into the region and move the

stuff into Darfur and then, as Julie said, have people on the ground

so they can distribute it.

Let me just say one more thing on that. It is

a qualitative difference between sort of the larger contextual economic

sanctions that have been in place now for 7 or 8 years since

the Clinton administration and picking out individuals in the government

who are being assessed to have been complicit or responsible

for mass atrocities, perhaps even genocide, and then saying

to those people: You perhaps over the next 20, 30 years of your life

are going to be unable to travel anywhere, your assets are going

to be frozen, and some day you will sit in the dock like Milosevic

did and some of the others did from the Rwandan genocide.

I think sending those messages now, not starting the process because

it is a long, lumbering process of actually establishing these

mechanisms of accountability, but saying we are going to start

doing that, getting Ambassador Prosper out there this week or next

week, and saying, we are collecting evidence on individual culpability

in this context, that is a different quality of fish and I think

that really will have an impact.

I think that, to add to precisely what Julie

just said, those are the first motives. They also want to drain the

water to catch the fish. I think there is a long history of this government

using these kinds of tactics in a number of parts of southern

Sudan and central Sudan. Any time there is a rebellion or opposition,

they go straight after the civilian population.

They have learned and honed these tactics over the years, so now

the use of the Antonov bombers, the use of the attack helicopters,

the use of ethnic militias, is the principal part of their strategy, of

their military strategy. They very rarely engage armed rebel elements

because it is so effective to clear the populations out of these

areas, because then it denies the rebels the civilian base in which

it can move around.

I think that we also have to understand that the government is

trying to send a very clear message to every corner of Sudan that

if anyone attempts, especially in northern Sudan, to try to overthrow

this government, to try to challenge this government, this is

the kind of reaction they are going to get. And that message has

been delivered.

The government is definitely not unified on this. There are military

and civilian elements within the government that are unalterably

opposed to this kind of strategy. They did not mind when they

were doing it to the southerners, but now they are doing it to people

in Darfur, Muslim populations, and populations which—of

course, Darfur is heavily represented in the center, especially in

the military, so a number of people have been replaced, a number

of high-level military officials have been jailed or killed and transferred.

So a lot has gone on internally over the last few months that has

been highly destabilizing in the region. So you have a number of

trends within the government over Darfur that are causing fissures

at a time when they need unity to move forward on this agenda

with respect to the SPLM.

Well, there really is not. It is bleeding on in

a way that is quite disconcerting and I think the fact that there

has not been a deadline introduced undermines the leverage that

the international community might hold.

The fact that the Security Council has not acted yet, and we just

talked a bit about that with Senator Alexander, the fact that the

Security Council has not acted on Darfur and has not sent the kind

of message that needs to be sent to the Sudanese Government, is

simply emboldening them to continue to undertake the kind of obstruction

and use of food as a weapon that Roger Winter was talking

about earlier.

So I think there has to be this kind of urgency introduced, that

if *x* does not happen then *y* is going to result. There has to be conditionality

and there has to be pressures and threats that begin to

be introduced into the discussion. In the absence of that, we are

not going to have any leverage.

I understand that you are looking at legislation. We heard from

Senator Biden a little while ago that there is some discussion about

legislation. It is urgently important that we do not undertake a

solely incentive-based strategy to try to bring these, to drag these

guys along. Whether or not they get assistance, foreign assistance,

when they are getting a billion dollars a year in oil income is irrelevant

to their calculations. We need to be introducing very specific

measures of accountability that we are threatening to use, and if

multilaterally we cannot do it we will push it unilaterally until others

go along with us, and I think that if we simply rely on incentives

right now, as we have for the last 9 months, trying to drag

these guys across the finish line in Naivasha, it is simply going to

undermine our own capacity for additional leverage.